The housing ladder, taxation, and borrowing constraints by Swank, J. (Job) et al.
 
THE HOUSING LADDER, TAXATION, AND 
BORROWING CONSTRAINTS✧ 
 
 
 
Job Swanka,b,* 
 
Jan Kakesa 
 
Alexander F. Tiemana 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a multi-tier model of the housing market, we show that both starters and movers 
benefit from mortgage interest deduction for higher income groups. However, such tax 
favouring also tends to facilitate house price explosions, especially when interest rates 
and downpayment ratios are low. More in general, the efficiency of implicit tax 
subsidies to homeowners depends critically on the price responsiveness of new 
construction, which is found to differ strongly from country to country. Irrespective of 
supply conditions, running down mortgage interest deduction is likely to detract from 
the profits of lending institutions. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
The tax treatment of owner-occupied housing is a recurrent theme in the economic 
literature. Not quite surprisingly, most studies in the field concern the US tax system, 
which is known for its generosity towards homeowners. Rosen (1979), for example, 
examines the efficiency and distributional implications of mortgage interest deduction 
on the basis of cross-sectional data from a panel of 2150 US households. He finds that 
elimination of the implicit tax subsidy for homeowners tends to reduce the demand for 
owner-occupied housing substantially and to level the distribution of disposable 
incomes. Capozza et al. (1996) also foresee large declines in mortgage borrowing 
(particularly by higher income groups) and house prices, which could cause significant 
problems for financial intermediaries. 
 
While a total removal of tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments would clearly 
have far-reaching consequences for both households and the mortgage industry, it is not 
a foregone conclusion that tax favouring of homeowners delivers what it is intended to 
do. Since long, this issue has been under heated discussion among politicians and 
academics in the Netherlands, where the preferential tax treatment of homeowners is 
comparable with US practice. At the same time, time-inconsistency problems and 
electoral motives tend to prevent leading policy makers from reconsidering the tax 
advantage of owner-occupied housing on a fundamental score. However, similar 
debates in other countries have resulted in the curtailment (Denmark, Sweden) or 
abolishment (UK) of mortgage interest deduction. This would suggest that there are exit 
strategies that are politically feasible, in spite of vested interests of voters who are 
locked in by the former tax-preferred regime. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse how the tax treatment of homeowners affects the 
working of the housing market, how it interferes with credit constraints imposed by 
lending institutions, and how it affects the profitability of the mortgage industry. We 
present a theoretical model discerning starters and movers on the owner-occupied 
housing ladder, who demand different home types, who have different incomes and who 
face different relative user costs of home owning. Since movers supply their former 
dwellings to starters, the two segments of the housing market are closely connected, and 
so are the respective property prices. With expectations of future home prices entering 
into the user costs of starters and movers, expectation formation turns out to be crucial 
for the emergence of stable equilibrium prices. 
 
The theoretical analysis reveals that the effects of tax-preferred treatment of owner-
occupied housing are conditional upon country-specific features of both housing and 
mortgage markets. Data limitations prevent us from estimating all relevant parameters 
of the model for various countries. However, the overriding conclusion following from 
the model is that the efficiency of implicit tax subsidies depends critically on the price 
elasticity of newly built dwellings. We make an attempt, therefore, to present some 
empirical evidence of housing supply conditions in a number of countries, which allows 
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 us to judge whether or not the specific tax treatment of homeowners is warranted in the 
countries considered. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. 
In section 3, the basic effects of tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments are 
discussed. Sections 4 and 5 introduce credit rationing and bank behaviour into the 
model. Section 6 presents tentative econometric results on the price responsiveness of 
newly built homes in a selection of countries. Conclusions are drawn in the final 
section. 
 
2. A theoretical model of the market for owner-occupied housing 
 
Following Ortalo-Magné and Rady (1999, 2001), two types of owner-occupied housing 
are distinguished: starter homes (henceforth “flats”) and larger dwellings (henceforth 
“houses”). The supply of flats, Sf , equals the demand for houses (exerted by settled flat 
owners seeking to move up the housing ladder), Dh , plus newly built flats, Nf . This is 
eq. (1). The supply of houses, Sh , equals newly built houses, Nh , plus houses supplied 
by homeowners leaving the housing ladder due to exogenous factors (death, emigration 
etc.), .hS  This is eq. (2). Physical decay of the existing stocks of flats and houses is 
ignored. The prices of flats, Pf , and houses, Ph , follow from equilibrium between 
demand and supply in the respective markets (eqs. (3) and (4)), provided that potential 
homebuyers are not rationed by lending institutions. This proviso is weakened later. 
Newly built flats and houses are linear functions (eqs. (5) and (6)) of the respective 
prices (relative to a suitable cost index captured by the slope coefficients α1 and β1) and 
of shift parameters representing all other influences. A more comprehensive approach 
would be to allow for partial adjustment,1 and to explicitly identify cost factors (such as 
construction costs, residential land prices and building cost subsidies). However, these 
extensions would unduly obscure the theoretical analysis. We also abstract from 
speculation by homebuilders temporarily holding (part of) their completed dwellings 
from the market in anticipation of future increases in property prices. 
 
Two types of house hunters are relevant for the dynamic process in the market for 
owner-occupied housing: “starters” and “movers”. The decision process of potential 
starters is formalized by eq. (7), which elaborates on user-cost formulations by Pain and 
Westaway (1997, p. 594) and Poterba (1984, p. 732, fn. 6). Given his real (permanent) 
disposable income, sy  (assumed exogenous), a potential starter considers buying a flat 
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1  Hakfoort and Matysiak (1997) and Topel and Rosen (1988) give a theoretical 
underpinning. An overview of relevant arguments is contained in DiPasquale and 
Wheaton (1994, pp. 7-9). 
 on the basis of the difference between the (exogenous) real rent of his current home, ,R  
and the real cost of owning a flat.2 The latter is defined from the following assumptions: 
),isτ
i. When applying for mortgage credit, starters face binding downpayment 
requirements to the amount of ,fPδ  where δ is the minimum downpayment ratio. 
These downpayments are made from own funds with opportunity cost 1(i −  
where i is the (expected) nominal yield of financial assets, and isτ  is the marginal 
tax rate on income from financial wealth faced by starters. The financing gap 
fP)1( δ−
),1( lsli
 is filled by a nonamortizable mortgage loan with after-tax interest rate 
τ−  where  is the (fixed) nominal mortgage interest rate, and li lsτ  is the 
effective rate of tax relief on mortgage interest payments faced by starters. 
ii. Consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis, (potential) homeowners reckon by real 
rather than nominal interest rates, so that the after-tax interest rates have to be 
adjusted for the rate of expected future capital gains:  for flats, 
where  is the expectation of the flat price for the next period, formed in the 
current period. 
1/ −= feff PPε
e
fP
iii. The purchase of property and the arrangement of mortgage credit involve 
transaction costs, which also include stamp duty. These expenses are typically 
incurred in the period that a home is traded. We assume that transaction costs are 
fully borne by the buyer of property, that they can be expressed as a fixed 
proportion κ of the purchase price, and that they require an additional 
downpayment with opportunity cost )1( isi τ−  for starters. 
iv. For notational and analytical convenience, we disregard property and capital gains 
taxes, as well as taxation of imputed rent.3 The costs of maintenance and 
depreciation are also ignored. 
v. The real cost of owning a flat is obtained by deflating the nominal cost, or Pf  for 
that sake, by the (exogenous) consumer price index (excluding housing services), 
Pc. To save on notation and verbiage, the current value of this index is set to unity 
(Pc = 1). 
 
Turning now to the demand for houses (i.e. larger dwellings), the simplifying 
assumption is made that the purchase of a house is only attainable for a settled flat 
owner having real (permanent) disposable income ,sm yy >  where my  is exogenous.4 
Besides, the decision to move is based on the difference between the real user cost 
                                                          
2  Taking rents as an exogenous variable is motivated by the fact that a significant part of 
the rental sector is subject to government intervention (housing programmes, rent control 
etc.). 
3  The ways in which these taxes are levied differ strongly from country to country and are 
sometimes quite complicated. This is especially true of imputed rent taxes, which may be 
subject to ingenious indexation schemes (the Netherlands is a case in point). 
4  It is also assumed that homeowners do not move down the housing ladder. 
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 involved in buying a house (also including transaction costs) and the real user cost of 
staying in a flat. The incremental effective interest burden faced by movers depends on 
their past borrowing behaviour, on current financial conditions (liquid asset holdings, 
interest rates etc.), and on the tax treatment of borrowing on collateral appreciation. 
Since each mover has his own housing history, a continuum of mover cohorts should be 
distinguished, at least in principle, with the classification of movers depending on the 
time period in which they bought their flats. While this would undeniably add a lot of 
realism to the model, it would also render the analysis quite intractable. We choose, 
therefore, to consider only two extreme scenarios. The first scenario is one in which 
movers – as former flat owners – have consistently cashed in capital gains on their 
properties by raising their mortgages up to the maximum loan-to-value ratio (1 – δ). 
Such behaviour is typically found in an environment where the effective yield of 
financial assets exceeds the effective mortgage interest rate, usually owing to a tax 
regime that is friendly to both mortgagees and households investing in financial assets 
lmτ(  high and imτ  low): ),1()1( imlml ii ττ −<−  where lmτ  is the effective rate of tax 
relief on mortgage interest payments faced by movers, and imτ  is the marginal tax rate 
on income from financial wealth faced by movers. Under the circumstances, the 
remaining borrowing capacity of movers is ),f() P1( h P−− δ  which is fully utilized, 
motivated by the same arbitrage condition. As a consequence, an amount of )( fh PP −δ  
has to be brought in as own funds, so that the incremental effective interest burden 
faced by movers is { ).fP() hm P(} hP)1( im)1()1( lml ii fP −=−−+−− στδτδ  This 
expression is contained in eq. (8), next to terms representing transaction costs and the 
rate of expected future capital gains  consonant with assumptions (ii) 
and (iii) above.
),1−hP/( = ehh Pε
5 In the second scenario, movers use the full surplus-value of their flats 
as downpayments, which are assumed to satisfy the minimum requirement ).( hPδ 6 The 
remaining financing gap is closed by a new mortgage loan, which comes on top of the 
existing loan arranged earlier for the purchase of a flat.7 Such behaviour is typically 
found in an environment where the effective mortgage interest rate exceeds the effective 
yield of financial assets: ).1()1( imlml ii ττ −>−  Under these circumstances, arbitrage is 
not paying, and the incremental effective interest burden faced by movers is simply 
),fP() hlm P −1(li −τ  which is mathematically equivalent to setting δ = 0 in eq. (10). In 
the remainder, the first scenario is taken as our starting point, and we come back to the 
second scenario only on occasion. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5  Again, property prices are deflated by Pc = 1. 
6  By implication, the amount of capital gains to be realized on flat sales must at least be 
equal to  ).()1( 1 fh PP −− −δδ
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7  So, apart from the payment of transaction costs, movers in this scenario are assumed not 
to have accumulated (or to use) liquid asset holdings for the purchase of a house. 
 Now, the complete basic model reads: 
 
(1) fhf NDS +=  
(2) hhh SNS +=  
(3)  ff DS =
(4)  hh DS =
(5) ff PN 10 αα +=  
(6) hh PN 10 ββ +=  
(7) })({210 RPyD ffssf −−−+= ερϕϕϕ  
(8) })()({210 ffmhhmmh PPyD εσερψψψ −−−−+=  
(9) )1()()1()1( islsls ii τκδτδρ −++−−=  
(10) )1()()1()1( imlmlm ii τκδτδρ −++−−=  
(11) )1( immm i τκρσ −−=  
 
Throughout, it is assumed that 1α  and 1β  are non-negative and that 121 ,, ψϕϕ and 2ψ  
are positive. Combining eqs. (1) to (8) gives for Pf  and Ph : 
 
(12) ( ) 1011002112 /)()(})({ νψψβψϕϕϕβερψ ′+−′+′+++−= mshmf yRyP  
(13) ( ) 1011200212 /)(})({)()( νψψαερϕψϕϕϕεσψ ′++−+′+′++−= mfssfmh yRyP  
(14) 0000 αψϕϕ −−=′  
(15) 000 βψψ −−=′ hS  
(16) 1212121 )(})({})({ βεσψβερψαερϕν fmhmfs −++−+−=  
 
We assume that all real user costs are positive: ,fs ερ >  ,hm ερ >  and .fm εσ >
/= hehh PPε
 This 
premise can be avoided by substituting the expected future rates of change in flat and 
house prices in eqs. (7) and (8) by their definitions  and  
and solving the resulting equations for P
1/ −fef P( =f Pε ),1−
f  and Ph : 
 
(17)
2022111
200212
/})()({
/})({)1(
νϕψϕψϕβ
νψϕϕϕρψ
′+−−++−+
′+′++++=
e
f
e
h
e
fms
e
fsmf
PPRPyy
RPyP
 
 
(18) 
202112
200212
/})({})1({
/})({)1(
νψψψαρϕ
νψϕϕϕσψ
′+−++++
′+′++++=
e
f
e
hms
e
fsmh
PPy
RPyP
 
 
(19) 1212122 )1(})1({})1({ βσψβρψαρϕν mms ++++++=  
 9
 The relevance of either eqs. (12) and (13) or eqs. (17) and (18) depends on the way in 
which expectations about future flat and house prices are formed. In case of rational 
expectations, eqs. (17) and (18) should be used as a basis for further analysis. Below, it 
is assumed that the expected rates of change in flat and house prices fε(  and )hε  are 
constant in that they are not affected by shocks, unless stated otherwise. By implication, 
the expected price levels of flats and houses respond to any impulse x according to 
 and  xPxP ffef ∂∂+=∂∂ /)1(/ ε =∂∂ xPeh / xPhh ∂∂+ /)1( ε  respectively. This corresponds to 
a simple (call it naive) form of adaptive expectations, which suffices for the greater part 
of the analysis. 
 
Some basic features of the model are worth mentioning before addressing issues of 
taxability and credit rationing. It is easily verified that a rise in real disposable income 
of starters not only raises the price of flats )0/( >∂∂ sf yP  but also the price of houses 
)0/( >∂∂ sh yP . The latter effect occurs because the induced increase in the price of flats 
creates a capital gain, which reduces the financing gap of (potential) movers. As a 
consequence, demand for houses and, hence, the price of houses rise. Through the same 
mechanism, an increase in the real rent raises both the price of flats )0/( >∂∂ RPf  and 
the price of houses ).0/( >∂∂ RPh  A rise in real disposable income of movers, on the 
other hand, raises the price of houses )0/( >∂∂ mh yP  while reducing the price of flats 
)0/( <∂∂ mf yP  provided that .01 >β  In fact, the incomes of movers act as a wedge 
between flat and house prices. This implies that starter homes become more affordable 
by rising mover incomes (other things being equal). However, the prospects of moving 
for remaining flat owners (also including starters) at some future point in time 
deteriorate because of higher house prices and smaller capital gains generated by 
existing property. Under rational expectations, the gap between house and flat prices 
may even explode. This can be seen by solving eqs. (17) and (18) recursively, using the 
law of iterated expectations, and determining, then, .fh PP −  For purposes of 
illustration, we ignore transaction costs (κ = 0) and confine ourselves to the case where 
the supply of houses is completely price-inelastic (β1 = 0):8 
 
(20) 
mm
e
m
m
e
m
m
m
fh
yy
yPP ρψ
ψ
ρρρψ
ψ
βκ
2
0
2
21
2
1
1
....
)1(1)1(0
′+








++++++===−
++  
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8  Throughout the paper, we tacitly assume that the expected future levels of the effective 
interest rates ( ),, mms σρρ  and the consumer price deflator equal the respective actual 
levels whenever rational expectations are considered. Admittedly, such a simplification 
is not completely satisfactory, especially where the consumer price index is concerned. 
However, abandoning it would seriously impede the derivation and interpretation of 
rational expectations results, as the model is non-linear in the variables mentioned. 
 So, the gap between house and flat prices depends on the sum of actual and discounted 
expected future incomes of movers, with the effective interest rate faced by movers 
serving as the one-period discount rate. Now, assume that real disposable income of 
movers is expected to grow at a constant rate  over each future time period, so that 
eq. (20) becomes: 
mg
 
(21) 
mm
m
m
m
m
m
fh
ggyPP ρψ
ψ
ρρρψ
ψ
βκ
2
0
2
2
2
1
1
....
)1(
)1(
1
11
)1(0
′+


 ++
+++
+++===−  
 
This “fundamental” solution converges if the expected future growth rate of real 
disposable income is smaller than the effective interest rate faced by movers ).( mmg ρ<  
If this condition is not met, we are left with an explosive process.9 It is readily apparent 
from eq. (10) that tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments for (prospective) 
house owners does no good here, as it brings nearer the violation of the convergence 
condition. As a corollary, tax deductibility for higher income groups can have a 
devastating impact on housing market dynamics when the economy suddenly moves to 
an expansion path entailing higher (expected) growth rates of mover incomes, 
especially in an environment of low interest rates. This may serve as a rationale for the 
recent abolition or curtailment of tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments in a 
number of European countries. In fact, such policies are a sound anticipation of the 
awaited “new economy”.10 Note also from eq. (10) that a relaxation of (binding) 
downpayment requirements (∆δ < 0) may also break the aforementioned convergence 
condition and thereby destabilize price formation in the housing market. This is 
especially likely to occur under a tax regime that strongly encourages arbitrage between 
mortgage borrowing and financial investment.11 We return to the effects of borrowing 
constraints in section 5. 
 
3. Basic effects of tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments 
 
Tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments is often claimed to stimulate owner-
occupied housing. The present section examines whether our model supports this aim. 
A broadening of tax deductibility is associated with an increase in lsτ  or .lmτ  First, 
                                                          
9  If ,01 >β  convergence is more likely to occur. For the sake of argument, assume that 
.02 =ϕ  Then, it is easily verified that  is the relevant 
condition. 
1
2
1
1111 )(
−−++< ψβαβαρmmg
10  One qualification is in order. Macroeconomic equilibrium may require that a permanent 
rise in productivity and real income growth be accompanied by a permanent increase in 
nominal interest rates at given inflation levels. Note, however, that this affects the 
housing market only mildly as long as mortgage interest payments remain tax deductible. 
So, the point remains valid, apart from extreme scenarios where .mm g∆≥∆ ρ  
 11
11  For, ),1()1(/ lmlimm ii ττδρ −−−=∂∂  which is larger as imτ  is lower and as lmτ  is 
higher. If there are no arbitrage opportunities (scenario 2), .0/ =∂∂ δρm  
 consider the effects of an impulse in the deduction of mortgage interest paid by starters 
:)( lsτ  
( 1 =α
 
(22) ( ) 0/)1(})({/ 1122 >−+−=∂∂ νδβερψϕτ flhmlsf PiP  
 
(23) 0/)1()(/ 122 >−−=∂∂ νδερψϕτ flfmlsh PiP  
 
(24) 0//// 11 ≥∂∂+∂∂=∂∂=∂∂ lshlsflsflsf PPSD τβταττ  
 
(25) 0/// 1 ≥∂∂=∂∂=∂∂ lshlshlsh PSD τβττ  
 
As it turns out, fiscal accommodation of starters raises the prices of flats and houses 
unambiguously. With elastic supply of houses ),0( 1 >β  the price of flats rises more than 
the price of houses, provided that the expected future rates of change in flat and house 
prices do not differ too much ).( 1βεε <− fh  Also, flat owning is boosted more than 
house owning, unless the supply of newly built flats is completely price-inelastic 
).0  In this last case, flat owning is only stimulated to the extent that the induced 
rise in the price of flats motivates settled flat owners to move to a house (through larger 
realized capital gains). If neither flat builders nor house builders are responsive to price 
changes ),0( 11 == βα  implicit tax subsidies are totally inefficient. In that case, only 
mortgagees and settled homeowners profit.12 One could argue that the government may 
take accompanying measures aimed at shifting the supply schedules autonomously (i.e. 
raising 0α  or ).0β  But while such policies are (highly) effective in isolation, tax 
deductibility would still be pointless under the circumstances. 
 
The effects of an impulse in the deduction of mortgage interest paid by movers )( lmτ  
are: 
 
(26) 0/)()1(/ 112 ≤−−−=∂∂ νδβψτ fhllmf PPiP  
 
(27) 0/)()1(})({/ 1122 >−−+−=∂∂ νδαερϕψτ fhlfslmh PPiP  
 
(28) 0/)()1()(// 1122 ≥−−−=∂∂=∂∂ νδβερϕψττ fhlfslmflmf PPiSD  
 
(29) 0/// 1 ≥∂∂=∂∂=∂∂ lmhlmhlmh PSD τβττ  
 
                                                          
 12
12 It remains to be seen, of course, to what extent this is also true in a general equilibrium 
context, as fiscal accommodation of home owning has to be covered by an increase in 
tax collections or through other budgetary means. This raises complicated issues of 
income redistribution, which are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 Granted that the price of houses exceeds the price of flats, fiscal accommodation of 
movers drives up the price of houses unambiguously. This incites additional new 
housing development, provided that ,01 >β  which enables the number of movers to 
increase. As a result, more flats become available to starters, so that the price of flats 
must fall in order to restore equilibrium. From these effects, it follows that limiting the 
deductibility of mortgage interest paid by higher income groups (e.g. to the effective 
rate of tax relief faced by starters) would be detrimental for all income groups seeking 
to move up the housing ladder. However, as has been demonstrated at the end of the 
previous section, there may be circumstances in which such a policy would still be wise 
so as to prevent price explosions in the housing market. 
 
4. Credit rationing 
 
As discussed by LaFayette et al. (1995) and Linneman and Wachter (1989), typical 
borrowing constraints imposed by mortgagees on their clients take the form of either 
income or wealth constraints. The model presented in section 2 has already a wealth 
constraint, formulated as a downpayment requirement. In line with actual practice in a 
number of countries (e.g. Canada, the UK, the US and the Netherlands), the present 
section imposes an income constraint in addition, specifying that a starter’s before-tax 
mortgage interest payments must not exceed some fixed proportion, q, of his current 
before-tax nominal income, .sY  It is assumed that this restriction is binding for all 
starters, so that: 
 
(30) sfl YqPi =− *)1( δ  
 
where  is the market price of flats under credit rationing. Lafayette et al. 
(1995, pp. 1-2) rationalize constraints like eq. (30) as follows: “Because lenders base 
borrowing capacity on observable/verifiable current income and wealth rather than 
total tangible wealth plus human capital, a household’s demand for housing may be 
constrained by a borrowing limitation in addition to the usual budget constraint. This is 
most likely true in the case of a younger individual whose future earnings are often 
significantly greater than his or her current income and accumulated wealth.” On a 
macroeconomic level, eq. (30) implies that the price of flats is entirely determined by 
lending institutions, given i  and 
)(* ff PP <
l ,s
f S>
Y  and that some would-be starters are quantity-
rationed in the market for flats  Now, eq. (30) replaces the market-clearing 
condition for flats, eq. (3), and can be combined with the other model equations to 
obtain the effects of a broadening of tax deductibility under credit rationing: 
).( fD
 
(31)  0/////// ** =∂∂=∂∂=∂∂=∂∂=∂∂=∂∂=∂∂ lmflmflshlshlsflshlsf DPSDSPP τττττττ
 
(32) 0/ 2 >=∂∂ slsf YqD ϕτ  
 13
 (33)  0)/(/)()1(/ 21* >+−−−=∂∂ ψβερδτ hmfhllmh PPiP
 
(34) 0//// 1 ≥∂∂=∂∂=∂∂=∂∂ lmhlmhlmhlmf PSDS τβτττ  
 
At first sight, fiscal accommodation of starters seems to be quite efficient in that the 
demand for flats is boosted, while both the price of flats and the price of houses remain 
unchanged. The snag is, of course, that this extra demand is not met by extra supply, as 
the price of flats does not accomplish equilibrium anymore. By implication, the only 
result is an increase in the number of would-be starters for whom there are no flats. One 
obvious remedy is to stimulate new development of flats or houses through autonomous 
policies aimed at raising α0, α1, β0 or β1. However, while the desired effects of such 
measures are indisputable, tax deductibility for starters adds nothing as long as the 
income constraint imposed on mortgage applicants keeps the price of flats below its 
market-clearing level. In other words, if rationing of potential starters persists, there is 
no point in boosting the demand for flats, whether supply-oriented policies are pursued 
or not. It is interesting to note from eq. (34) that fiscal accommodation of movers rather 
than starters can be of help here, provided that β1 > 0. The reason is that the demand for 
(additional) mortgage loans of movers is not income-constrained (by assumption). As a 
consequence, a broadening of tax deductibility for higher income groups induces more 
eligible flat owners to move to a house, thereby increasing the supply of flats. It follows 
that restricting tax deduction to an upper limit may thwart the promotion of owner-
occupied housing. By the same token, a cut in stamp duty (i.e. a reduction in κ) can 
deliver what tax deductibility for starters cannot under the circumstances: 
 
(35)  0/* =∂∂− κfP
 
(36) 0)/(/)1(/ 21 >+−−=∂−∂ ψβερτκ hmhimh PiP  
 
(37)  0)1(/ *2 >−=∂∂− fisf PiD τϕκ
 
(38) 0//// 1 ≥∂∂−=∂∂−=∂∂−=∂−∂ κβκκκ hhhf PSDS  
 
So, while a cut in stamp duty stimulates the demand for flats (just as a rise in lsτ  does), 
it also creates additional supply of flats through an increase in the number of movers. 
Clearly, the latter effect is greater as the supply of newly built houses is more price-
elastic (i.e. as 1β  is larger). 
 
In the typical case that competition in the mortgage market is imperfect, lending 
institutions are likely to gain from fiscal accommodation of movers or from a reduction 
in stamp duty. This can be seen as follows. Assume that there are n identical profit 
maximizing mortgagees displaying Cournot-behaviour. Marginal funding costs, i, are 
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 taken as given, and we adopt a quadratic resource cost function C  with  the 
amount of mortgage loans supplied by the individual intermediary (j = 1, …, n). We 
ignore risk, which is not essential to the argument. In this setting, the equilibrium 
mortgage interest rate is given by: 
,½ 2jj Lγ= jL
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where L is aggregate demand for mortgage loans, and .0)/)(/( >∂∂−= LiiL llθ 13 Under 
credit rationing, L equals: 
 
(40)  })({)1( ** hfhff DPPSPL −+−= δ
 
We assume, as an approximation, that θ is constant and greater than 1.14 Now, the profit 
for an intermediary on (new) mortgage lending, ,jΠ  is defined by: 
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Upon substituting eqs. (39) and (40) into eq. (41), and differentiating jΠ  with respect 
to lmτ  and κ−  gives: 
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These are virtually windfall profits for the industry. Note that mortgagees still benefit in 
case the supply of newly built houses is completely price-inelastic (β1 = 0). Clearly, 
financial intermediaries have good reason to be set against policies aimed at limiting the 
deductibility of mortgage interest payments.15 Their only comfort would be an 
appreciation of the collateral underlying outstanding mortgage loans to flat owners: 
                                                          
13  For a similar representation of bank market structure, see VanHoose (1988). 
14  It can be shown that 1=θ  if .011 ====== κεεδβα hf  On less stringent conditions, 
however, θ  tends to exceed 1 (by far) and to vary with interest rates, tax parameters etc. 
Note from eq. (39) that the monopoly solution (n = 1) only exists for .1>θ  
 15
15  In principle, the same goes for settled house owners. However, their direct losses could 
be mitigated by transitional tax arrangements (grandfathering etc.), which are generally 
of no use to lending institutions. 
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The practical significance of this effect should not be overrated, as it entirely hinges on 
the assumption of increasing marginal resource costs (γ  > 0). 
 
As for eqs. (42) and (43), two qualifications are in order. First, these results should be 
considered upper limits in that an increase in profitability may induce market entry (∆n 
> 0), at least in the long run. This would erode the (short-term) gains from tax 
deductibility at the firm level.16 Second, the results would be different, although with 
the same signs, if movers were not constrained by downpayment requirements. This 
case was referred to as the second scenario in section 2, and we leave it to the reader to 
check that the qualitative conclusions are robust. 
 
5. A further look at the maximum debt-service ratio 
 
Lending institutions as a group may have a firm grip on the prices of owner-occupied 
dwellings through mortgage qualification constraints like eq. (30). This is quite evident 
from recent experiences in the Netherlands, where growth rates of both mortgage 
lending and house prices have sky-rocketed over the past ten years or so, owing to a 
substantial easing of debt-service requirements. As a result, and facilitated by relatively 
large implicit tax subsidies to homeowners, outstanding mortgage debt per inhabitant in 
the Netherlands is now the second highest in Europe, after Denmark. Whether or not 
this has helped starters a lot, remains to be seen. 
 
In what follows, we take the mortgage interest rate as given, which comes to the same 
thing as neglecting marginal resource costs (γ = 0) in eq. (39). Note first, from eq. (30), 
that an increase in the maximum debt-service ratio (q) raises the price of flats and the 
interest burden of starters equiproportionally (other things being equal).17 Hence, 
starters who would already have succeeded in finding a flat under the former (more 
stringent) borrowing constraint are definitely worse off (to the credit of mortgagees). On 
the other hand, the induced rise in the price of flats reduces demand rationing in the 
market for flats through three channels, labelled (a), (b) and (c): 
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16  Under perfect competition (n → ∞), the effects contained in eqs. (42) and (43) naturally 
disappear. 
 16
17  This is a direct consequence of the assumption that the mortgage qualification constraint 
is binding for all starters. 
 Channel (a) is a discouragement effect, containing that some tenants are no longer 
motivated to buy a flat. Channel (b) relates to price-induced new development of flats. 
Channel (c) contains that more settled flat owners move to a house because of larger 
realized capital gains, provided that the induced rise in the price of houses stimulates 
new development of houses (β1 > 0). If the supply of newly built flats and houses is 
completely price-inelastic (α1 = β1 = 0), only the discouragement effect is left, which is 
certainly not conducive to the promotion of owner-occupied housing. So, as with the 
efficiency of implicit tax subsidies, the allocational effects of an increase in the 
maximum debt-service ratio depend crucially on the price-responsiveness of new 
housing development. 
 
Although a sustained increase in the maximum debt-service ratio causes a permanent 
shock in housing prices, such a shift in lending policy cannot be held responsible for the 
occurrence of an explosive process. The proof is straightforward. With credit rationing, 
the solution for the price of houses under rational expectations is: 
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where  is the expected periodical rate of growth in real disposable income of movers 
(as defined in section 2), and  is the expected periodical rate of growth in nominal 
income of starters. For the solution of  to be stable, it is necessary and sufficient that: 
mg
sg
hP
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As long as this inequality holds (and credit rationing persists), any increase in q will 
cause a finite change in the price of houses: 
 
(48)  qPgqP fmsmh /})//()({/ *21 ψβρσ +−=∂∂
 
This change can be either positive or negative, depending on the sign of ).( sm g−σ  
 
Like in section 2, the convergence condition contained in eq. (47) may be violated by 
changes in fundamentals such as a rise in the expected growth rate of mover incomes or 
a fall in interest rates. The result would be a boom in house prices, which the policy 
maker might be able to stop by curtailing or abolishing tax deductibility for movers (i.e. 
by lowering ).lmτ  Evidently, such an explosive process is more likely to emerge as 1β  
is smaller (relative to ).2ψ  It follows, again, that implicit tax subsidies to higher income 
groups and inelastic supply of newly built houses are a bad combination from a 
viewpoint of stable housing market dynamics. High loan-to-value ratios of movers (1 – 
δ) also turn out to be potentially destabilizing, at least under a tax regime that incites 
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 arbitrage between mortgage borrowing and financial investment: i ).1()1( imlml i ττ −<− 18 
This corroborates in an extreme sense empirical findings by Lamont and Stein (1999), 
who report that house prices at the US city level respond stronger to shocks to per-
capita income as there are more highly leveraged homeowners. 
 
6. Housing supply in a selection of countries: an empirical digression 
 
One of the main conclusions that can be drawn from the previous sections is that fiscal 
accommodation of homeownership does not have the desired effect if the supply of 
newly built dwellings is price-inelastic. The aim of this section is to supplement our 
theoretical analysis with empirical evidence on housing supply conditions in a 
heterogeneous group of countries, consisting of Denmark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, the UK and the US. To bring the results into perspective, table 1 
summarizes some relevant features of these countries. 
 
Table 1.  Country-specific characteristics housing and mortgage markets 
 
Country Owner-
occupancy 
rate (1999, 
%) 
Tax deductibility 
of mortgage 
interest 
paymentsa 
Taxation of 
imputed 
rental 
incomea 
Typical 
LTV new 
mortgages 
(2001, %) 
House price 
volatilityb 
Denmark 51 Gradually limited Gradually 
lifted 
80 0.13 
France 54 - - 75 0.07 
Germany 41 - - 65 0.05 
Netherlands 51 Full Mild 100 0.23 
UK 67 Gradually lifted - 70 0.24 
US 66 Full - 78 0.14 
 
a From the mid-1980s onward. Minor (changes in) regulations are left aside. 
b House prices deflated by CPI; variation coefficient over 1970-1999. 
Sources: European Mortgage Federation (1997), OECD (2001). 
 
As revealed by column 1, homeownership is particularly widespread in the UK and the 
US. Columns 2 and 3 capture two principal characteristics of the fiscal treatment of 
homeowners, which is most favourable in the US (interest payments fully deductible, 
imputed rental income untaxed) and the Netherlands (interest payments fully deductible, 
imputed rental income taxed relatively mildly), followed at a distance by Denmark. 
Quite interestingly, LTV-ratios in these three countries are the highest in our sample. 
Also striking are the differences in house price volatility. Real property prices have 
                                                          
 18
18  In the alternative scenario (the second one in section 2), movers are not constrained by 
downpayment requirements, implying that δ  = 0 in eq. (47). So, in that case, the 
argument is no longer valid. 
 been most stable in France and Germany – both countries having no history of 
noticeable tax favouring of homeowners – and relatively volatile in the Netherlands and 
the UK. These last two countries experienced a boom in the late 1970s and the late 
1980s respectively, in both cases followed by a sharp correction. 
 
Empirical evidence on the price responsiveness of new housing supply is scarce, which 
is primarily due to measurement problems (see DiPasquale, 1999). The total housing 
stock is not a suitable supply indicator, as the bulk of dwellings are not on the market. 
This is not to deny that a significant part of new housing supply may come from the 
existing stock of houses as a result of property division or the sale of rented dwellings to 
households. However, since time series data on these sources are scarce or absent, we 
focus on new construction, measured by the number of building permits issued per time 
period.19 The relationship explaining this variable is derived in appendix 1 from a small 
structural model of price-taking construction firms aiming at maximum profits: 
tconfatcapatwageatpriceataatperm 5)(log4)(log3)(log210)(log)49( +++++=
 
We have estimated this equation using quarterly data covering a period of two to three 
decades on housing permits issued (perm), residential house prices (price), wage costs 
(wage), capital costs (cap), approximated by a weighted average of short-term and long-
term interest rates, and producer confidence (conf ).20 The equation for Germany also 
includes a reunification dummy, which is unity from the first quarter of 1991 onward 
and zero before that date. Note that equation (49) is unlikely to suffer from simultaneity 
problems, as the time lag between the acquisition of a building permit and the 
completion of a new house is usually over a year, rendering the explanatory variables 
virtually exogenous vis-à-vis the dependent variable. 
 
Following the strategy proposed by Dolado et al. (1990), we have applied Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for unit roots and found out that a number of series are not 
(trend-) stationary in levels. Table 2 summarizes the results. We have decided, 
therefore, to estimate eq. (49) for each country in first differences of the series 
(seasonally adjusted where relevant).21 Apart from Germany, using OLS caused serious 
problems of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity in the residuals, as revealed 
by Engle’s (1982) LM test. This led us to extend the regression model by (first- or 
second-order) ARCH and GARCH terms. Besides an attempt to obtain more efficient 
estimators of the parameters, the adoption of an ARCH model may also be warranted on 
economic grounds in our case. To a certain extent, the decision to build a house is a 
 19
                                                          
19 Poterba (1984) uses residential investment in new houses; Topel and Rosen (1988) use 
total housing starts; Hakfoort and Matysiak (1997) use unsubsidized housing starts. 
20  Appendix 2 describes the data sources; t stands for the quarterly time period. 
21  Adding cointegration residuals (where appropriate) did not yield meaningful results. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, the ADF-test detected two unit roots in the series for the US 
wage rate. We have nevertheless treated the series as I(1), also because the Phillips-
Perron test convincingly indicated so. 
 speculative one. It depends – partly or wholly – on expectations about future house 
prices and construction costs, both of which are notoriously uncertain, even over a one-
year horizon. Relatedly, and perhaps more importantly, our dependent variable (i.e. 
permits issued) is an imprecise – or rather conditional – measure of new housing supply, 
as it merely represents the right to build a house, which may or may not be asserted. As 
such, it can be given the interpretation of a put option with unspecified exercise price 
and expiration date. Hence, there is a clear affinity with financial time series analysis, 
where ARCH models have become generally accepted. 
 
Table 2.  Number of unit roots per series (5% significance level) 
 
Country log (perm) log (price) log (wage) log (cap) conf 
Denmark 1 1 1 0 1 
France 0 1 0 0 1 
Germany 1 1 0 1 1 
Netherlands 0 0 0 -a 1 
UK 0 1 0 1 0 
US 0 0 2 1 0 
 
a  Dutch interest rates disregarded because of wrongly signed parameter estimates. 
 
The estimation results thus obtained are recorded in table 3. As it turns out, the price 
elasticities of new construction differ widely across countries.22 They are relatively 
large in France, Germany and the US, and quite small and insignificant in the 
Netherlands and the UK. Denmark is somewhere in between. As far as the European 
countries are concerned, the three having the smallest price elasticities experienced the 
highest volatility in house prices over the past 30 years (see the last column of table 1), 
which is consistent with the theoretical analysis in previous sections. Moreover, all 
these countries (used to) have tax-preferred treatment of homeowners. It follows that 
both Denmark and particularly the UK were right to run down tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments, thereby reducing the chances of price explosions in the 
market for owner-occupied housing. Dutch fiscal policy is inscrutable in this regard, as 
new construction in the Netherlands does not significantly react to changes in house 
prices, nor to any other market force. This clearly reflects that housing supply in the 
Netherlands is largely determined – if not repressed – by sweeping government 
intervention. On top of that, Dutch lending institutions have an itch for lending 
excessively to new homeowners, judging from the extreme LTV-ratio recorded in table 
1, thereby further destabilizing price formation in the housing market. Things are 
different in the US, probably the country having the most favourable tax regime for 
mortgage borrowers: a comparatively large price elasticity of new construction, a 
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22  Estimated price elasticities of housing supply also differ widely across studies for a 
single country, depending on definitions and the econometric methodology used. Ours 
are on the lower side. See DiPasquale (1999) for a review of empirical work on the US. 
 moderate LTV-ratio and – by consequence – modest volatility in house prices (although 
considerably higher than in France and Germany, which have no major tax-
preferences). So, with the possible exception of the US, tax favouring of homeowners is 
(or was) found in countries where housing market conditions least warrant it. 
 
Table 3.  Estimated elasticities of new housing supplya 
 
Country price 
(c2) 
wage 
(c3) 
cap 
(c4) 
conf b 
(c5) 
Standard 
error of 
regression
Wald-testc 
on 
c2 = - c3 - c4 
Sample period 
Denmark 0.66 
(4.4) 
-1.01 
(0.8) 
-0.14
(3.4)
0.003 
(4.9) 
0.16 0.69 1980:2-1999:4 
France 1.09 
(2.6) 
-0.83 
(2.7) 
-0.23
(2.2)
0.004 
(2.5) 
0.07 0.93 1981:2-1998:3 
Germany 2.05 
(2.2) 
-0.33 
(0.7) 
-0.23
(1.9)
0.005 
(3.3) 
0.08 0.10 1976:2-1999:4 
Netherlands 0.30 
(0.9) 
-0.57 
(1.3) 
-d 
 
0.004 
(1.1) 
0.15 0.60 1976:2-1998:3 
UK 0.45 
(1.3) 
-0.50 
(0.8) 
-0.31
(3.4)
0.004 
(3.5) 
0.13 0.43 1976:2-1999:4 
US 1.40 
(3.5) 
-1.87 
(1.8) 
-0.20
(2.0)
0.006 
(3.7) 
0.09 0.48 1970:2-1999:4 
 
a Absolute z-statistics in brackets (t-statistics for Germany). 
b Semi-elasticity. 
c Probability-values associated with the relevant χ2-statistic. 
d Suppressed because of wrong sign. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows: 
• At given user costs, property prices in different segments of the market for owner-
occupied housing are primarily driven by real disposable incomes of both starters 
and movers. Rising starter incomes tend to raise house prices over the entire 
housing ladder, whereas mover incomes act as a wedge between the prices of 
starter homes and houses in the more expensive segment. Under rational 
expectations, this gap may even explode. Such an event is more likely to occur as 
higher income groups are allowed to deduct mortgage interest payments at a higher 
tax rate and as nominal interest rates are lower. High loan-to-value ratios turn out to 
be destabilizing as well, at least under a tax regime that incites arbitrage between 
mortgage borrowing and financial investment. 
• The efficiency of implicit tax subsidies to homeowners depends crucially on the 
price responsiveness of newly built houses. 
 21
 • Limiting the deductibility of mortgage interest paid by higher income groups would 
be detrimental for all income groups seeking to move up the housing ladder, 
although there may be circumstances in which such a policy would still be wise so 
as to prevent price explosions in the housing market. 
• As long as (all) starters are credit-rationed by lending institutions through an 
income constraint, there is no point in boosting their demand by implicit tax 
subsidies. The reason is that such a constraint prevents the price of starter homes to 
react to changes in the real effective interest rate faced by starters. However, under 
the circumstances, a cut in stamp duty can deliver what tax deductibility for starters 
cannot. 
• In the typical case that competition in the mortgage market is imperfect, lending 
institutions are likely to gain from fiscal accommodation of movers or from a 
reduction in stamp duty, also in case the supply of newly built houses is completely 
price-inelastic. It follows that mortgagees have good reason to be set against 
policies aimed at limiting the deductibility of mortgage interest payments. 
• Consistent with the results of our theoretical model, we find that the volatility in the 
prices of owner-occupied housing in a heterogeneous group of countries can be 
traced back to (a combination of) price-inelastic supply of newly built dwellings, 
preferential tax treatment of homeowners and high LTV-ratios. Quite remarkably, 
our econometric analysis reveals that the price responsiveness of new construction 
is smallest in the countries which (used to) have material tax deductibility of 
mortgage interest payments, with the notable exception of the US. As far as the 
European countries are concerned, it follows that this instrument is hardly effective 
in stimulating homeownership. It would seem that the authorities in Denmark and 
the UK have come to realize that, given their recent efforts to run down mortgage 
interest deduction. Judging by our results, the Netherlands would have a strong case 
to follow that example. 
 
We acknowledge that both the theoretical model and the empirical analysis in this paper 
are fairly simple. For example, time dynamics only appear in the formulation of 
forward-looking behaviour with respect to the formation of expectations about future 
property prices. In actual practice, adjustment costs and nominal rigidities may give rise 
to partial adjustment of housing volumes and prices, possibly leading to lengthy 
divergences between short-run and long-run solutions. Furthermore, a complete 
assessment of the welfare effects of tax deductibility would ideally require a general 
equilibrium analysis that goes far beyond the scope of our undertaking (see, e.g., 
Nakagami and Pereira, 1996). We have also ignored land, both in the theoretical model 
and in the empirical analysis. Since most supply of newly built dwellings entails 
demand for land, mortgage interest deduction may be (partly) capitalized in residential 
land prices. Finally, although we believe that this paper produces convincing evidence 
that the tax-preferred treatment of owner-occupied housing has not been very effective 
in a number of European countries, our framework does not indicate what is the best 
way (and the best moment) to abolish those tax advantages. Such a policy assessment 
would require – at the least – an explicit account of the effects on the financial position 
of settled homeowners, which sets quite an agenda for future analytical work. One thing 
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 is sure, though. If the public is taken by surprise under the very conditions that rendered 
the tax deduction inefficient (i.e. conducive to booming house prices), the downward 
correction in house prices is likely to be huge. This argues in favour of a gradual 
dismantlement, announced well in advance of its implementation. 
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 Appendix 1.  A model of new construction 
 
Construction firms are assumed to maximize (expected) profits, subject to a decreasing-
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, relating new development (N) to 
labour (A) and capital (K). Land is ignored because of lack of appropriate time series 
data. We assume that the market for new construction is perfectly competitive and that 
there is no monopsony in the factor markets. Hence, the (expected) prices of output 
(price) and the respective factor inputs (wage and cap) are given to the individual 
construction firm. These assumptions lead to the following optimization problem (time-
subscripts are suppressed): 
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From the first-order conditions, and after taking logs, it follows that: 
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Upon substituting eqs. (A3) and (A4) into the logarithmic version of eq. (A2) gives: 
 
(A5) )(log)(log)(log)(log 43210 capawageapriceataaN ++++=  
 
where  ;)1(;)}(log)(log{)1( 11321332201320 λλλλλλλλλλ −− −−=++−−= aa
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Eq. (A5) is a long-run supply equation. Deviations from this relation may occur due to 
short-run fluctuations in demand, at least to the extent that construction firms can and 
will absorb such shocks through variations in factor utilization. This aspect is captured 
by adding to eq. (A5) a suitable indicator of producer confidence (conf ), having zero 
average: 
 
(A6) confacapawageapriceataaN 543210 )(log)(log)(log)(log +++++=  
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 Since our measures of new construction and input prices are fairly rough, and also 
because of uncertainty about the actual production technology used by construction 
firms (which also includes land as a production factor), we have not imposed in our 
estimations the theoretical restriction that .432 aaa −−=  However, according to a Wald-
test (recorded in table 3), the null hypothesis of this parameter restriction cannot be 
rejected at the 5% significance level for any country considered. 
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 Appendix 2.  Description of data sources 
 
The data sources used for the estimation of eq. (49) are recorded below. The complete 
data set is available from the authors on request. 
 
Country Series Source* 
 
Denmark Housing permits issued OECD 
 Residential house price BIS 
 Wage rate construction sector ** Datastream 
 Capital costs (rS) *** IFS 
 Producer confidence construction sector EC 
 
France  Housing permits issued BIS 
 Residential house price BIS 
 Wage rate construction sector Datastream 
 Capital costs (0.1 rS + 0.9 rL) IFS 
 Producer confidence construction sector EC 
 
Germany  Housing permits issued BIS 
 Residential house price BIS 
 Wage rate Datastream  
 Capital costs (0.4 rS + 0.6 rL) IFS 
 Producer confidence construction sector EC 
 
Netherlands  Housing permits issued BIS 
  Residential house price BIS 
 Wage rate construction sector ** IFS/Datastream 
 Producer confidence construction sector EC 
 
U.K.  Housing permits issued Datastream 
  Residential house price BIS 
 Wage rate IFS 
 Capital costs (0.6 rS + 0.4 rL) IFS 
 Producer confidence EC 
 
U.S.  Housing permits issued BIS 
  Residential house price BIS 
 Wage rate Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 Capital costs (0.2 rS + 0.8 rL) IFS 
 Producer confidence Institute for Supply Management 
__________________ 
* BIS = Bank for International Settlements Database 
 EC = European Commission 
 IFS = IMF International Financial Statistics 
** Approximated on the basis of various series taken from the sources mentioned.  
*** rS = money market interest rate; rL = capital market interest rate. The weights have 
been chosen such that the log likelihood is maximized. 
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